IP controversies are an increasing part of biotechnology policy discussions. Those concerned that strong IP regimes may limit innovation have considered patent thickets, The current state of knowledge renders answers to such questions highly speculative, so we also suggest research strategies that might lead to more definitive answers.
Introduction
During the past quarter century, innovation and growth have characterized the biotechnology industries. At the same time, multinational agreements have strengthened and harmonized global intellectual property standards. The link between these two developments is the subject of much controversy. Did economic growth occur because of the growth of IPRs? Did economic growth occur despite the growth of IPRs? Or was the growth of IPRs an institutional manifestation of the economic interests concomitant to economic growth? Academic research and public policy discussions during the 1990s explored many concerns about the increased scope and global reach of IPRs, including IPRs in biotechnology. A spectre is haunting the biotech industry---the critics seem to say---the spectre of IPRs. Despite the rapid growth of the biotechnology industries, one common concern is that the proliferation of IPRs may raise the costs of innovation and thereby slow technological progress. A second concern is distributional: the increasing global scope of IPRs appears to disadvantage developing countries, who accede to a regime of global IPR harmonization without possessing the IPR riches of the developed countries. A related concern is that the assertion of IPRs over the genetic resources of developing countries may constitute a kind of "biopiracy" by developed countries. Such concerns are entangled with a concern that proprietary rights (such as patents) may be inappropriate in the field of biotechnology, where innovations may be mere discoveries and where substantial publicsector research funding can make it difficult to determine the substantial contributions of private agents.
Claims to biotechnological innovations are currently asserted as patent rights, plant breeder's rights, trade secrecy, trademarks, and to a lesser extent copyrights. It is practically axiomatic that the present system has many defenders. However it also has vocal critics who call for reform. Proposals for reform include shifting the mix of proprietary instruments (e.g. emphasizing plant breeder's rights instead of patents) and creating new specialized forms of protection (e.g., "sui generis" provisions). Such responses leave largely unquestioned the traditional proprietary model of innovation. In this chapter, we explore an alternative: we This emulation often appears quite natural: both software and biotechnology are emerging fields of study, and there are some important parallels between the two fields. 1 Indeed, the open development movement in some areas of biotechnology, such as computational biology, is largely an extension of the FOSS movement. Our goal in the present chapter is to expand interest and encourage further inquiry into the OpenBio approach to biotech research and innovation.
Both the OpenBio and FOSS movements are in large part a reaction to the proliferation of IPRs and to concerns that IPRs may restrict research and access to new innovations. These concerns stem from a similar basis: both software and biotechnological innovation are often cumulative and sequential, and innovations in both areas often constitute 1 As Dawkins (2004) writes "genes are software subroutines that perform cellular operations." research tools. Moreover, in both areas some observers have claimed that IPRs are too often granted for inappropriate subject matter: pre-existing art, or pure science, or even pure mathematics. For example, in software, certain innovations appear to be essentially mathematical algorithms, and in biotech, certain innovations appear to be essentially scientific discoveries. In both fields, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between basic R&D and applied R&D (Stokes 1997 ).
There are also important differences between the two industries. These differences determine the extent to which lessons from the FOSS movement are applicable to the OpenBio movement. In particular, we are interested in differences that matter for research, innovation, and economic development.
This chapter is organized as follows. First we provide a very brief review of the IP framework relevant to biotech research and development. In the process, we briefly introduce Finally, we explore some implications of the OpenBio movement for developing countries.
Biotechnology and Intellectual Property
This chapter allows for a broad definition of 'biotechnology'. Following the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), we use 'biotechnology' to mean "any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use." Ambiguities in this definition (for example, in the meaning of "technological application") will not be important for our purposes. We wish to explore the role of intellectual property institutions in supporting or restraining biotechnological innovation and developing country access to such innovation.
The Green Revolution typifies early agricultural biotechnology innovation in an important way: the public sector and non-governmental organizations were heavily involved in its development. In contrast, industrial biotechnology consistently has been centered in the private sector. This distinction was never absolute and may no longer be tenable: large multinational firms are heavily involved in agricultural biotechnology, and in the fast evolving area of genetically modified organisms there have been complaints that public sector participation is largely missing in some important negotiations (such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety).
The predominance of the developed-world private sector, and also its assertion of private intellectual property rights in innovations based on developing country resources and knowledge, has generated substantial international conflict. Developing countries have been seen as "gene-rich" in their biodiversity, and even rich in traditional knowledge of potential therapeutic agents, but firms from developed countries possess the technological know-how and financial resources needed to bring innovations to market and to establish contemporary intellectual property rights in these innovations.
IP Background
The past century has seen radical shifts in intellectual property institutions, and the creation of new kinds of property rights has been particularly striking in biotechnology. The access to this tool substantially delayed their development of herbicide tolerant crops (Pray and Naseem 2005) . The swell of patenting in the biotech industry has raised fears that such stories of delayed development will become increasingly frequent.
Proprietary Lifeforms
International agreements and organizations have established the mechanisms by which rights to biotechnological inventions are protected, including trade secrets, plant breeder's rights (PBRs) or plant variety protection (PVP), and patents. We briefly discuss the relationship between PBRs and patents, and then discuss patents in more detail. Patents are generally more expensive to obtain (to file, translate, and litigate) than
PBRs. Even so, the cost to obtain a UPOV authorized Breeders' Right certificate in developing countries is expected by some observers to exclude all but the largest seed companies (Sahai 1999) .
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The most economically important differences between patents and PBRs are the criteria for grant. Patents are granted if inventions are judged to be novel, non-obvious, and industrially applicable (i.e., the invention has utility). PBRs are granted if the protected organism is distinct (compared to previous varieties) and has never before been commercialized. Note that patents are not supposed to be granted for discoveries of substances found in nature, but PBRs may be granted for discoveries (of things in the wild).
Another crucial distinction is that patent grants (in principle, at least) have an enablement requirement. The patent application must allow someone ordinarily skilled in the art to replicate the invention. Enablement with biotechnology can be tricky: replication may not be ensured (e.g., with mutation). It may also be that, lacking a specimen, third parties Article 27.3b of TRIPS does allow countries to exclude from patentability "plants and animals", as well as essentially biological processes other than microorganisms and microbiological processes. Here "essentially biological" means rooted in processes occurring naturally nature (not implemented by the scientist). The term "microorganism" is ambiguous:
it could mean any microscopic organism, or only a unicellular organism. While Article 27.3b allows countries the right to exclude plants and animals from patentability, it does not prohibit them from allowing it, as for example the US and Japan have chosen to do.
Functions of Patents and PBRs
We have seen that patents and PBRs share many characteristics. We turn now to some of the anticipated economic effects of such IPRs.
Patents and PBRs are designed to transform a public good into a club good. Since my use of your invention does not reduce your ability to use it, we say that knowledge is nonrivalrous in consumption. If in addition you cannot exclude me from using your invention, we say that the knowledge is non-excludable. Public goods are characterized by non-rivalry and non-exclusion, so in this sense knowledge can be a public good. But in a society that creates intellectual property rights, knowledge may become excludable. Club goods are characterized by non-rivalry and exclusion, so in this sense knowledge can become a club good. From a public policy perspective, exclusion may mean that a club good is underutilized. Since knowledge is so ideally non-rivalrous, it is natural to explore the relative merits of creating excludability. The conventional view is that there are tradeoffs between the dynamic benefits and static costs.
Fostering Innovation
Biotech firms make extensive use of IPRs, especially patents. This suggests that these firms find it profitable to claim IPRs, but it does not imply that this activity is socially beneficial. Public justifications of strong IPRs generally presume that the creation of such rights will promote innovation and commercialization. Ideally, the dynamic public benefit of bringing additional innovation to market will outweigh the static costs of granting rights of excludability. Theoretical and applied work by economists indicates that this ideal need not always be achieved, offering important qualifications to the standard understanding of innovation.
From a public policy perspective, intellectual property regimes are an effort to make sure that socially profitable activities are commercially profitable, so that private individuals will pursue them. Trade secrets, patents, and PBRs increase the economic reward to innovation by limiting the free access of competitors to the fruits of invention. Patents and PBRs accomplish this by granting temporary rights of exclusion. Since patent applications are public documents, patents may additionally speed knowledge diffusion to the extent that the innovation is truly novel and the patent application truly enables others to understand and implement the innovation. (Such benefits clearly depend on the quality of patent institutions.) Polanvyi (1944) famously argues that "pioneer enterprises should in general be protected against free competition", and certainly many research activities of biotech firms qualify as pioneer enterprises. The basic intuition is simple when large sunk costs are required to realize important innovations that might easily be copied ex post. Additionally, Polanvyi refers to a "strong presumption" that patent protection is required to secure profitability adequate to justify both the research investment and venture capital, especially when we consider innovation occurring outside of established firms. 
Constraining Innovation
The tale of the mid-19th century dyestuff industry appears as a cautionary tale in the discussion of patents and innovation: vigorous patent enforcement in Britain, home to the initial innovations, appears to have stifled the industry, which in contrast grew explosively and prospered under Germany's looser IP laws (Murmann 2003) . Some studies of the contemporary software industry sound a similar cautionary note. In an empirical examination of software manufacturing, Bessen and Hunt (2003) find that software patenting activity can substitute for firm innovation effort. They argue that the predominant use of software patents appears related to strategic "patent thicket" behavior, rather than being a means to protect R&D investments. Naturally such results call into question the role of software patents in bioinformatics. More generally, these results raise serious questions about the role of strong IPRs in any industry that shares key characteristics with software manufacturing. For example, Bessen and Maskin (2000) show that strong patent protection can reduce innovation in industries where innovation is sequential and complementary. (That is, later innovations rely on earlier innovations to be practiced.) While Bessen and Maskin focused on IT related industries, sequential and complementary innovation appears characteristic of many biotech research efforts. Indeed, survey evidence finds that many industry researchers in the biological sciences have delayed, changed, or abandoned research projects due to complex licensing negotiations over necessary technologies (Hansen, Brewster, and Asher 2005) .
Patent Thickets
Rai (2004) observes that "large pharmaceutical firms---once vertically integrated engines of innovation---must now negotiate a complex array of university and small firm proprietary claims on research inputs", some of which are subject to exclusive licenses.
Economists refer to the need for such negotiations under the general rubric of "transactions costs". When the transactions costs associated with with overlapping and dispersed IPRs begin to constrain innovation, we refer to a "thicket" of IPRs. The literature on such constraints has focused on patent thickets.
More generally, when innovation is cumulative and sequential, multiple parties may hold overlapping and/or fragmented IPRs to the different components necessary to constitute a larger innovation. The resulting transactions costs are potentially innovation reducing (Isaac and Park, 2004) . Inventors reduce their level of effort, knowing that in the future that they will face these costs. These effects are worse when the extent of the patent thicket is unknown, since an inventor who sinks costs into innovation will be in a weaker negotiating position with the possessors of relevant IPRs. Indeed, "blocking" may occur if the IP holder refuses to license or demands a high royalty.
Potrykus and Beyer's "golden rice" is a well known example. A biotech innovation of the mid-1990s, golden rice produces beta-keratin, and thus could potentially mitigate deadly vitamin-A deficiency in millions of children in rice-consuming developing countries. Striving to bring this product to the developing world, Potrykus learned that more than two dozen different biotech companies claimed patents on the technologies used to create golden rice (Piore 2003) . In this case the thicket was successfully penetrated, and eventually the primary patent holder agreed to offer golden rice seed freely to small farmers in developing countries.
Unfortunately, the mechanism for cutting through the patent thicket may not be replicable: it appears to reflect a pressing need felt by green biotech firms to garner some favorable press.
Research Tools
IPRs on core research tools may be particularly problematic. In the commercial sector, they may increase transactions costs on a wide range of innovators. Academic researchers may also be affected, as discussed below. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) University (Madey v. Duke) suggests that the "research exemption" strategy will see declining use in the U.S. However European and Japanese patent law is more inclined to protect the unrestricted access of academic researchers to patented tools of research (Eisenberg 2003) .
The Anti-Commons
If IPR holders are blocking one another, their technologies may be underutilized. This blocking may be intentional, or it may simply represent the high transactions costs of negotiating with diverse IP holders. In either circumstance, useful technology may never be developed, and extant innovations may remain unexploited. The term 'anti-commons' is meant to capture the role of strong property rights in producing an underuse of knowledge when IPRs transform it into a club good by creating rights of exclusion. The term is chosen to contrast with the theory that real property held in common (the commons) will be overused in the presence of inadequate property rights. Murray and Stern (2005) broke new ground by offering modest empirical support for the anti-commons thesis: they look for citation frequency declines for scientific publications (in one journal, Nature Biotechnology) after patents are granted in the innovations described in the publications. They find a decline relative to other papers, whether or not the patented knowledge involves a research tool. Unfortunately citation rates are an extremely indirect measure of knowledge diffusion, and the authors consider only scientific citations, not patent citations. They also did not address lags in scientific publications (e.g., due to the refereeing process), which might be rectified by adding working papers to their analysis. Nevertheless, their results are suggestive. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) wrote what is probably the most widely cited paper on the anti-commons in biotechnology. They discuss the implications of expressed sequence tag (EST) patenting. ESTs are considered an important research tool in gene discovery and sequence identification. In 1991, a group of NIH researchers attempted to patent a large collection of ESTs, but they abandoned this attempted after encountering resistance from the USPTO. Many human ESTs are now contained in the freely accessible 100 gigabase 7
Common goods are rivalrous but non-excludable, whereas club goods are non-rivalrous but excludable. Free and open (FO) development accompanying rapid innovation has been noted in many industries. This seems to challenge the presumptions of many intellectual property arguments. Rosenberg (1976) documents FO development in the machine tool industry, von Hippel (1988) in the scientific instrument industry, and Allen (1983) The success of the SNP Consortium appears surprising. Each individual firm seems likely to face substantial incentives to "defect" and patent its SNP discoveries. This will provide bargaining chips if the other firms patent, and it will gain a competitive advantage if the other firms do not patent. Explaining this success is beyond the scope of the current paper. However our brief analysis suggests that the SNP Consortium would not be a Nash equilibrium outcome in a "one-shot" game without precommitment, so that to understand its existence we would need to consider the roles of precommitment and of the diachronic relationships among the consortium members.
Incentives
Open development is often considered a puzzle. conditions. This is economically similar to the case of induced research tool development.
Owners may encourage their engineers to freely reveal knowledge that might lower the costs of competitors in anticipation both of their own lower cost and of a capital gain on complementary assets (e.g., the value of mines). Additionally, if the industry is oligopolistic, prices may not be viewed as tightly tied to costs of production.
Traditional theories of innovation tend to be manufacturer-centric (von Hippel, 2005 ).
Yet users also contribute to innovation. Users may freely reveal information to producers in hopes of having an innovation implemented. Users may know their needs better than manufacturers. Rather than be passive, they may actively participate in innovative activity and develop solutions customized to their needs. Users of research tools often propose improvements in functionality or interface. They may rely on open revelation to encourage the adoption of innovations that might otherwise be ignored.
Open revelation is easy to imagine, and easy to find, when users are skilled professionals desiring innovation in a heavily used research tool. It is more difficult to 
Analogies Between Biotech and Software
Popular discussions of FOSS applications can leave the impression that enterprise quality software is being produced as a hobby by amateurs, perhaps even by teenage hackers.
This would offer a substantial contrast to some biotech fields, where research can require a team of scientists with advanced degrees, and the credentials of scientists and engineers matter. Useful FOSS software is indeed written by individuals and small groups. However, writing enterprise quality software is generally not a trivial project, and substantial professional and corporate resources are also involved in the development of FOSS software. 9 Biotechnology projects like software projects vary in size and scope: some may need only the resources of a Luther Burbank or a Jonas Salk, while others may require the resources of Monsanto or Pfizer.
Some biotech research shares important characteristics with software development.
For example, some research in computational biology focuses on algorithm development. It is software development. Other biotech related research focuses on facilitating data exchange, which bears analogy to the W3C efforts to develop standards for information exchange on the web.
Lessons drawn from the FOSS movement are most likely to be applicable to such 9 Consider the heavy involvement of large corporations in the Carrier Grade Linux working group of the Open Source Development Lab.
near neighbors. But in biotech considered more generally there are some important differences.
Disanalogies Between Biotech and Software
Traditionally, software code has been protected by copyright, while biotech innovations have been protected by patents. (Obviously this is not a hard and fast distinction,
given the large role of software in bioinformatics, and given the growing use of software patents.) Copyright grants rights of exclusion for a very long time (e.g., life of author plus 70 years) but protects only a particular expression of an innovative idea. Patents offer a shorter period of protection (e.g., 20 years, or even less if the rights holder chooses not to renew his patent right) but protect the innovation and not just a particular expression. Copyright is much cheaper to obtain than a patent. Copyright is automatic, while patents applications involve filing fees, lawyer fees, translation fees, and depositing of materials, and even then the application may be rejected.
Outside of bioinformatics, open development is generally not simply a matter of source code sharing. Hope (2004) notes that technical information often is not enough to convey an innovation. "Uncodified" knowledge may be needed to understand how to practice an invention. Once we move outside bioinformatics, "open source" is largely a metaphor for open development: sharing the underlying technological secrets or information and giving access. When a patent holder excludes, knowledge should still be disclosed (through the patent application), but permission to practice the innovation is restricted.
In particular, the "open source" metaphor is misleading if it is applied to the "code" in biochemical sequences, including ESTs, SNPs, or even genes. If these are patented, the "code" is fully disclosed. Indeed, the revelation of "code" in such cases goes far beyond the standard applied in software patents, where software patents often do not have to reveal the underlying source code in order to satisfy the enablement requirement.
Another divergence of biotech from software manufacturing is that certain fields of biotechnology appear inherently capital intensive, requiring large labs and other physical capital. In addition, substantial sunk costs may derive from needs to comply with regulations (on health and safety) in order to get to market. Venture capitalists may have no incentive to fund biotech startups who cannot claim adequate proprietary rights in their innovations. This of course is just a contemporary application of the Polanvyi (1944) argument that "pioneer enterprises" need protection from free competition.
Hope (2004) From an economists perspective, one of the most fascinating developments in OpenBio is
The SNP Consortium, where commercial interests were driven to open development in an effort to reduce future transactions costs.
While user innovation has been important for research tools in bioinformatics and computational biology, it is much less plausible that consumers of biopharmaceuticals will propose improvements, and perhaps scarcely conceivable that even the most sophisticated consumer will be implementing improvements. If OpenBio really has few prospects in biopharmaceutical development, many proponents will be disappointed. Yet end user innovation appears rather unlikely, modularity looks low, and the costs of safety testing and regulatory compliance are high. Prospects for OpenBio look much better as we get closer to basic R&D, projects involving platforms, or enabling technologies.
Is OpenBio Good for Developing Countries?
Might OpenBio promote economic development more favourably than existing proprietary modes of innovation? Might it at least reduce the costs developing countries face in licensing products and research tools from the developed world? These are extremely general questions, for which we highlight some specific considerations. 
Neglected Diseases
Love ( drugs cannot be patented in developing countries.
Advances in computational biology make it plausible that OpenBio can facilitate some aspects of early-phase drug discovery. However many difficulties remain in actually bringing a drug to market. Firms in developed countries face extraordinary regulatory costs in the introduction of new drugs. The rise of a generic drug industry in the largest developing countries may allow them to support late-phase drug discovery and even development and testing efforts. However we suspect that, for now at least, large sunk costs in drug development will continue to pose a substantial barrier to OpenBio drug development.
Biopiracy
Some developing countries complain that foreign firms have been "pirating" their genetic resources and traditional knowledge. They claim that patents are granted for products derived from the genetic resources of the South without consent of the owners of the resources, and even without the knowledge of the owners. They also claim that patents are based on the traditional knowledge of the South, in which case the putative innovation is actually common knowledge (or prior art). This is the charge of "biopiracy".
Modern IP regimes do not deal easily with collective and traditional knowledge.
Developing countries have been clamoring for international reform in this area, to require Northern firms to obtain consent and to share the distribution of the benefits from patents.
This concern is reflected in the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), which however has no enforcement power. It is also reflected in the efforts by India to pre-empt biopiracy by digitally placing traditional knowledge into the public domain. Central to this effort is the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL), under the auspices of India's National
Institute of Science, Communication, and Information Resources (NISCAIR).
It is natural to ask why the South has not simply used the global intellectual property rules to assert IPRs in their "genetic" resources, which would allow them to charge Northern firms for licenses. Part of the answer lies in the current rules of the game: these can require that traditional knowledge and crops be modified before they can be protected, and developed countries currently have an advantage in producing such innovations. Stiglitz (2004) explores additional ways in which developed countries are disadvantaged in the IP race. Applying for IP protection is expensive. The process of obtaining international protection requires expertise that is more likely to be available to a large multinational firm. It is expensive to litigate or make invalidity challenges against developed country firms. In addition, the international system is based on first to file (not first to invent). This interacts with the need for IP-system expertise: it takes time and expertise to properly draft an application, giving an advantage to a rich experienced inventor (e.g., a multinational pharmaceutical firm). So even if a developing country inventor is first to invent, he may not be first to file. Such considerations raise concerns that the North will continue to amass massive patent portfolios and property claims, leaving the South with reduced access to new technologies and higher costs for technological goods, even those that are substantially derivative from the knowledge and resources of the South.
An OpenBio presence in research into indigenous crops and knowledge has the potential to reduce biopiracy. This is beneficial to developing countries who fear that foreign firms will end up with "pirated" IP rights that constrain indigenous users. Such an OpenBio effort may also foster local capabilities for innovation. But developing countries are sure to be interested in the revenue stream that might be harvested from local biological diversity and traditional knowlege, and open development is unlikely to directly support this. Whether
OpenBio will generate large complementary advantages, as discussed earlier, remains an open question.
Conclusion
The biotechnology industries are dynamic and innovative. There is a substantial public interest in keeping them that way. While it seems likely that IP policies will prove important, we cannot predict whether stronger IPRs will promote biotech innovation or hinder it. Indeed, the role of IPRs in promoting innovation is likely to differ by industry and by manufacturing stage. Research activities that generate large sunk costs in the production of final consumer products appear most likely to be well served by strong IPRs, especially if the products allow easy reverse engineering. Research activity that resembles basic research or is focused on research tools appears least likely to be well served by strong IPRs, which may constrain innovation by creating "thickets" of IPRs or by raising the costs of research tools (even to academic researchers).
Despite a growing understanding of the problems posed by overlapping and fragmented IP claims to innovation in industries characterized by sequential and cumulative innovation, the public policy momentum of the last quarter century has favored an increasingly expansive understanding of what constitutes appropriate subject matter for IP protection. Today there is little evidence of a public policy commitment to constrain an expansive biotech industry demand for IP protection. Even when industry participants would find a legislative constraint beneficial, we expect that they will often find it difficult to constrain themselves: group agreements not to assert IPRs are undermined by incentives to defect.
In an interesting development, we observe that industry occasionally overcomes this "prisoner's dilemma". The SNP Consortium is an outstanding example: important industry participants in gene research chose an open development model and formed a consortium to set SNPs "off limits" to patenting efforts. While such commercially focused efforts are not yet typical of the OpenBio movement, we find them extremely promising. Still, it is important to note that the successes we observe do not imply that legislative constraints are not needed: basic economic considerations suggest that such consortia will be in "undersupply".
The global expansion of IPRs also raises distributional concerns. To many observers, developing countries appear disadvantaged: they are acceding to a regime of global IPR harmonization that will extract substantial payments for developed world IPRs, but they do not possess IP riches of their own. Some observers argue that this disadvantage extends even to the assertion of IPRs in their own biological riches and traditional knowledge: developed countries have been accused of a kind of "biopiracy" as their firms race to establish IPRs in the genetic riches of the developing world.
Some proponents hope that the OpenBio movement will lessen the burden on developing countries. We agree that it is likely to increase developing country access to the data and the research tools that will be needed for indigenous biotech research efforts. Here we are speaking of lawful access: OpenBio developments are freely available to developing countries, which reduces the pressure on these countries to transgress recently harmonized IPR standards. However we are less hopeful that, on its own, OpenBio will lend much stimulus to the development of the biopharmaceutical innovations so desperately needed by the developing world. Instead, in this arena, we expect OpenBio to work best when complementary to targeted government research support. A detailed exploration of this complementarity is an important area for future research.
